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Labor Pooling as a Source of 
Agglomeration
An Empirical Investigation
Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
4.1    Introduction
Spatial concentrations of establishments and workers oﬀer great pro-
ductivity advantages. Many modern econometric studies have conﬁ  rmed 
and quantiﬁ  ed this important stylized fact. Estimates of the productivity 
increase from a doubling in the size of an agglomeration range between 2 
and 8 percent, depending on the sector and details of the estimation pro-
cedure (see Rosenthal and Strange [2004] and Combes et al. [chapter 1 in 
this volume]).
Unfortunately, the literature has been far less successful at distinguishing 
between the diﬀerent sources of urban increasing returns than at quantifying 
their overall magnitude. Speciﬁ  cally, while we have sound theoretical mod-
els providing microeconomic foundations for the economies of agglomera-
tion, the diﬀerent mechanisms are hard to distinguish empirically. The main 
diﬃculty arises from the “Marshallian equivalence” of these theories (see 
Duranton and Puga [2004]): they all predict an increase in productivity with 
spatial concentration but work through mechanisms that are hard to trace.
Henry G. Overman is professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics. 
Diego Puga is a research professor at the Madrid Institute for Advanced Studies (IMDEA) 
Social Sciences.
Thanks to Edward Glaeser and seminar participants at the NBER Urban Economics meet-
ing in March 2007 for comments. We are grateful to Roberto Picchizzolu for his help in pro-
viding us with data on energy use and research and development expenditures. Funding from 
the Comunidad de Madrid through the grant PROCIUDAD-  CM is gratefully acknowledged. 
This work contains statistical data from ONS, which is Crown copyright and reproduced with 
the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queen’s Printer for Scotland. The use of the 
ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the 
interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research data sets that may not 
exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.134        Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
This chapter focuses on a potential source of agglomeration economies 
to which Alfred Marshall (1890) devoted particular attention: labor market 
pooling. While there are various interpretations of labor market pooling as 
a source of agglomeration economies, Marshall emphasized that “a local-
ized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it oﬀers a constant 
market for skill” (Marshall 1890, 271). In section 4.2, we use a simple model 
to clarify the microeconomic foundations of labor pooling as a source of 
agglomeration economies and to motivate our empirical analysis. The model 
is a version of the labor pooling model of Krugman (1991). We consider 
a series of sectors where establishments experience idiosyncratic shocks. 
Individual proﬁ  ts are convex in the establishment- speciﬁ  c shock, since each 
establishment responds to the shock by adjusting its levels of both produc-
tion and employment. However, changes in the establishment’s employment 
aﬀect local wages, and the more isolated the establishment is from other 
establishments in the same sector or using similar workers, the greater the 
eﬀect. If wages are higher when the establishment wants to expand produc-
tion in response to a positive shock and lower when it wants to contract 
production in response to a negative shock, this limits the establishment’s 
ability to adapt its employment level to good and bad times. Consequently, 
establishments that tend to experience substantial changes in their employ-
ment relative to other establishments using workers with similar skills will 
ﬁ  nd it advantageous to locate in places where there is a large number of 
workers with such skills. As a result, the model predicts that sectors whose 
establishments experience more idiosyncratic volatility will be more spatially 
concentrated.1
To assess the importance of labor market pooling as a source of agglom-
eration economies empirically, we use establishment-  level data from the 
United Kingdom’s Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which under-
lies the Annual Census of Production. The data is described in section 4.3. 
We begin by constructing an establishment-  level measure of idiosyncratic 
employment shocks by calculating the diﬀerence between the percentage 
change in the establishment’s employment and the percentage change in 
the sector’s employment. We then average this (in absolute value) across 
time and across establishments in the sector to obtain a sector- level measure 
of how much idiosyncratic volatility individual establishments in each sec-
tor face. We then check whether, consistent with the theory, sectors whose 
1. Labor market pooling is not the only theoretical agglomeration mechanism operating 
through local labor markets. Larger markets also improve the chances of matching between 
ﬁ  rms and workers, as well as the average quality of matches (see Helsley and Strange [1990]). 
In addition, larger markets also encourage workers to focus on a narrower set of tasks and 
to acquire more specialized skills (see Baumgardner [1988], Becker and Murphy [1992], and 
Duranton [1998]). We focus just on labor pooling, whereby concentrations of employers using 
similar workers allow labor to move more easily from less- productive to more- productive ﬁ  rms. 
We maintain this speciﬁ  c focus because only by concentrating on the unique implications of a 
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establishments experience more idiosyncratic volatility are more spatially 
concentrated. We ﬁ  nd that this is indeed the case, even after controlling for 
a range of other industry characteristics that include a novel measure of the 
importance of localized intermediate suppliers.
4.2      The Theoretical Advantages of Labor Pooling
In this section, we present a simple model of labor pooling. This helps 
clarify the microeconomic foundations of labor pooling as a source of 
agglomeration economies. It also allows us to derive an empirically test-
able prediction about how the importance of labor pooling will vary across 
sectors. The model is a multisector and multilocation version of the labor 
pooling model of Krugman (1991).
4.2.1    Setup
Consider a series of sectors indexed by s   1, . . . , S. Each sector has a 
discrete number of production establishments distinguished by subindex 
i   1, . . . , N and a continuum of workers with skills speciﬁ  c to that sector. 
Establishments and workers are risk neutral. After choosing its location, 
each establishment receives a productivity shock εi. The shocks are uncorre-
lated across establishments and identically distributed over [– ε, ε] with mean 
zero and variance  s. Establishments observe these shocks and decide how 
much labor to hire from the local labor pool in the sector. If establishment i 
chooses an employment level li, it has operating proﬁ  ts given by:




 [li]2   wli.
4.2.2    Wages
Following Krugman (1991), assume that each establishment takes the 
local wage as given. Thus, after shocks are realized, each establishment hires 
labor until its marginal value product equals the wage. This yields establish-
ment i’s labor demand:
(2)  li   
    w   εi   
 
.
Denote by L the hours of labor eﬀectively supplied in a given city and sector. 
Labor market clearing, together with equation (2), implies
(3)  L   
i=1
N
∑li   
    w   ∑
N
i 1εi   
 
.
We can then solve for the market-  clearing wage from equation (3):
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Taking expectations yields the expected wage.2





4.2.3    Proﬁ  ts
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1), this simpliﬁ  es to:
(6)   i   




Note that establishment proﬁ  ts are a convex function of the idiosyncratic 
productivity shock, since the establishment adjusts its production level in 
response to the shock. Similarly, proﬁ  ts are convex in the wage.
Taking expectations of the proﬁ  ts in equation (6) yields:
(7)  E( i)   
[    E(w)]2   var[εi   w]
   
2 
.
Substituting equation (5) and var[εi –  w]   var[εi]   var(w) –  2cov[εi, w] into 
equation (7), this simpliﬁ  es to:








   
var[εi]   var(w)   2cov[εi, w]
    
2 
.
The ﬁ  rst term of the right-  hand side is what establishment proﬁ  ts would be 
in the absence of shocks. It increases as the ratio of workers to establish-
ments L/  N increases, because this lowers the expected wage. The second term 
captures the labor pooling eﬀect. This shows that expected proﬁ  ts increase 
with the variance of the establishment-  speciﬁ  c productivity shock, var[εi], 
and with the variance of the local wage, var(w), because of the convexity of 
proﬁ  ts previously discussed. However, they decrease with the covariance of 
the establishment-  speciﬁ  c productivity shock and the local wage, cov[εi, w]. 
The reason is that if the local wage is higher when an establishment wishes 
to expand production in response to a positive shock and lower when the 
establishment wishes to contract production in response to a negative shock, 
proﬁ  ts become less convex in the shock and fall in expectation. This is the key 
intuition of the model, which highlights the microeconomic foundations of 
labor pooling as a source of agglomeration: establishments prefer locations 
where their productivity shocks get ironed out rather than heavily reﬂ  ected in 
local wages.
To simplify equation (8) further, we can use equations (4) and (5) to cal-
culate var(w)    s/  N and cov[εi, w]    s/  N. Substituting these and var[εi]   
 s into equation (8) yields:
2. We assume that the support of the distribution of productivity shocks is not so large that 
the nonnegative employment constraint for some establishment might be binding under some 
realization of shocks. In particular, we assume that the restriction  /  ε   [2(N –  1)]/ L holds. This 
follows from li   0 and equations (2) and (4) for a case where εi   –  ε and εj   ε  j   i.Labor Pooling as a Source of Agglomeration: An Empirical Investigation    1 3 7
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where we have dropped subindex i, since expected proﬁ  ts are equal for all 
establishments in the same location and sector. The labor market pooling 
eﬀect, as captured by the term (1 –   [1/  N])( s/ 2 ), is stronger when the  s in 
the sector is higher. Thus, the beneﬁ  ts of labor pooling will be greater when 
the heterogeneity of establishment-  speciﬁ  c shocks in the sector is larger. This 
suggests that sectors with more heterogeneous shocks are more likely to be 
agglomerated. To show this more formally, we now explore two alternative 
deﬁ  nitions of an urban equilibrium in this model, both of which yield the 
same key testable prediction.
4.2.4      Equilibrium with Simultaneous Relocation by Firms and Workers
Following Ellison and Fudenberg (2003), let us ﬁ  rst treat location and 
production in this model as a two-  stage game. In the ﬁ  rst stage, all estab-
lishments and workers (whose total number is exogenously given) simul-
taneously choose their location. In the second stage, each establishment 
receives its productivity shock εi. Since there is a continuum of workers, a 
relocation by an individual worker has no eﬀect on wages or proﬁ  ts. Provided 
wages are equalized across locations, no worker has an incentive to relocate. 
From equation (5), this implies that the equilibrium ratio of workers to 
establishments L/  N must be the same in all locations.
Establishments, unlike workers, are discrete, and this assumption is essen-
tial for there to be advantages from labor pooling. Thus, a relocation by 
an individual establishment alters wages and proﬁ  ts at both the origin and 
destination of the relocation. In equilibrium, it must be the case that an 
individual establishment cannot increase the expected proﬁ  ts of equation 
(9) by deviating and locating elsewhere. An establishment must consider 
two aspects in deciding whether such a deviation is proﬁ  table. First, starting 
from a situation where wages are equalized across locations, the establish-
ment’s relocation would decrease the ratio of workers to establishments in 
the destination location, making the labor market tighter in expectation 
and increasing the expected wage, which would reduce the establishment’s 
expected proﬁ  ts. This labor market tightness eﬀect operates through the ﬁ  rst 
term on the right-  hand side of equation (9). Second, if after the deviation, 
the destination has a larger number of establishments, the establishment’s 
productivity shocks (that get translated into employment shocks) will not 
aﬀect the local wage as much, allowing the establishment to adapt better to 
circumstances and obtain higher expected proﬁ  ts. This is the labor pooling 
eﬀect previously discussed, summarized now by the second term on the 
right-  hand side of equation (9).
Suppose that the S sectors diﬀer only in terms of the variance of produc-
tivity shocks,  s. Then, the labor market tightness eﬀect favoring establish-138        Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
ment dispersion is equally strong across all sectors, but the labor market 
pooling eﬀect is stronger when  s in the sector is higher. Thus, the bal-
ance of agglomeration and dispersion forces tips more easily in favor of 
agglomeration when  s is higher. In particular, if a location has fewer than 
 s/ [2( 2R2    s)] times as many establishments as the largest agglomeration 
in the sector, all remaining establishments ﬁ  nd it individually proﬁ  table to 
relocate to the largest agglomeration.3 Thus, sectors with more heterogeneous 
shocks are more likely to be agglomerated. We will test this prediction empiri-
cally in section 4.4.
4.2.5      Equilibrium with Free Entry and an 
Agglomeration Wage Premium
The urban equilibrium we have just derived already captures the key pre-
diction used next to check the empirical relevance of labor pooling as a 
source of agglomeration. However, while theoretically elegant, it also has 
some counterfactual predictions for cities. In particular, in equilibrium, 
workers capture none of the beneﬁ  ts of agglomeration, whereas in practice, 
larger cities and denser agglomerations are associated with a signiﬁ  cant wage 
premium (see Glaeser and Maré [2001]; Wheaton and Lewis [2002]; and 
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon [2008]).
To capture this wage premium, following Glaeser (2008), we now redeﬁ  ne 
an equilibrium of the model so that the number of establishments in each 
city is endogenously determined by free entry and exit, taking the size of 
local labor markets as given. We let the size of the labor pool diﬀer across 
cities but keep it ﬁ  xed for simplicity (although this can be justiﬁ  ed through 
a heterogenous ﬁ  xed housing stock). The equilibrium number of establish-
ments in each city is then determined by free entry up to the point where 
a further increase in N would leave each establishment unable to cover the 
ﬁ  xed cost of entry, denoted  .4 Substituting equation (9) into E( )     and 
solving for N yields the equilibrium number of establishments in each city 
(ignoring integer constraints):
(10)  N =
 s
2 +4(2  − s) 
2L
2 − s
2(2  − s)
.
It follows from this expression that a city with a larger local labor market 
not only has more establishments but also a higher ratio of establishments 
to workers (or equivalently, a lower ratio of workers to establishments):
3. Stated diﬀerently, an equilibrium in this model is an allocation of workers and establish-
ments across locations such that each location is either empty or has at least  s/ 2( 2R2    s) as 
many establishments as the location with most establishments, and the ratio R of workers to 
establishments is the same in all nonempty locations as in the aggregate economy. See Ellison 
and Fudenberg (2003) for details.
4. Note that by equation (9), we must have      s/ 2 . Otherwise, entry would continue in-
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(11) 
 (L/  N)
 
 L
   
−2 s(2  − s)
 s
2 +4(2  − s) 
2L
2[  s
2 +4(2  − s) 
2L
2 − s]
    
− s
N  s
2 +4(2  − s) 
2L
2   0.
By equation (5), this creates a wage premium that oﬀsets the advantages of 






     
 (L/  N)
 
 L
   0.
The equilibrium with free entry, with its agglomeration wage premium, is 
quite diﬀerent from the equilibrium with simultaneous relocation of a ﬁ  xed 
number of establishments and workers. Still, the key prediction we wish 
to take to the data also holds. To see this, diﬀerentiate equation (10) with 
respect to  s to obtain:
(13) 
 2(L/  N)
 
 L  s  
   
1
 
2 2L21   
 s[ s
2   2 2L2(8     3 s)]
   
[ s
2   4(2      s) 2L2]3/2   0.
(The inequality      s/ 2  has been used to sign this derivative; see note 4.) 
This implies that cities with a larger local labor market attract a dispropor-
tionate number of establishments and that the eﬀect is stronger when  s in 
the sector is higher. Thus, once again, sectors with more heterogeneous shocks 
tend to be more agglomerated.
4.3    Data
To examine the role of labor pooling, we will regress a measure of spatial 
concentration for each sector on a measure of the potential for labor pool-
ing in the sector and a number of sectoral characteristics that are also likely 
to aﬀect geographic concentration. The measure of geographic concentra-
tion and the pooling variable described next are calculated using exhaustive 
establishment-  level data from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), 
which underlies the Annual Census of Production in the United Kingdom. 
We use data from 1994 to 2003. The data set is collected by the Oﬃce for 
National Statistics (ONS) and covers all UK establishments (see Griﬃth 
[1999] and Duranton and Overman [2005] for a detailed description of this 
data).5 For every establishment, we know its postcode, four-  digit industrial 
classiﬁ  cation, and employment. We restrict our attention to production 
5. We use the terms establishment and plant interchangeably. Our description of the data is 
based closely on Duranton and Overman (2005).140        Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
establishments in manufacturing industries using the Standard Industrial 
Classiﬁ  cation 92 (SIC 15000 to 36639) for the whole country except North-
ern Ireland. For the purposes of this exercise, we have plant data from the 
ARD for 1994 to 2003. We observe 557,595 plants at least once. On average, 
we observe each plant 4.16 times.
Since the labor pooling mechanism depends on establishments’ ability to 
take more or less workers from the local labor pool without diﬃculty, we 
must work with geographical units that correspond as closely as possible to 
local labor markets. Thus, our geographical units of analysis are the UK 
travel to work areas (TTWA), 1998 classiﬁ  cation. Similar to the labor mar-
ket areas that the Bureau of Labor Statistics deﬁ  nes for the United States, 
these TTWA are deﬁ  ned on the basis of commuting patterns to capture 
local labor markets. Speciﬁ  cally, the boundaries are drawn such that of the 
resident economically active population, at least 75 percent work in the area, 
and of everyone working in the area, at least 75 percent live in the area. The 
classiﬁ  cation is exhaustive, with 308 TTWA covering the whole of Great 
Britain. United Kingdom postcodes can be uniquely mapped to TTWA, so 
we are able to locate establishments in the ARD according to the TTWA 
classiﬁ  cation. The number of plants per TTWA is rather skewed. There are 
15,154 on average, while the median number is 4,545. There are fourteen 
TTWA with less than one hundred plants, although inclusion of the very 
large or the very small areas does not aﬀect our results, so we include the 
whole sample in what follows. One slight complication involves the treat-
ment of plants that move across TTWA or change sector. We treat these as 
a separate observation.6
Our controls for other industry characteristics come mainly from the ONS 
input- output (IO) tables, available annually from 1994 to 2003.7 We comple-
ment these where necessary with Eurostat’s detailed enterprise statistics for 
the United Kingdom and the ARD itself. We provide more details as we 
introduce these controls.
4.4      The Importance of Labor Pooling for Industry Concentration
The theoretical model of section 4.2 suggests that sectors whose estab-
lishments experience more heterogeneous employment shocks have greater 
potential to beneﬁ  t from labor pooling and, to exploit this, will be more 
6. Moves across TTWA should not actually happen, as plant identiﬁ  ers are supposed to des-
ignate a unique physical entity. In reality, ﬁ  rms sometimes report under the same plant identiﬁ  er 
when they have actually moved plants. This justiﬁ  es our decision to treat these observations 
separately. The issue of changing SIC is more problematic, as these classiﬁ  cations are based on 
the most signiﬁ  cant activity undertaken at a given plant and may change over time.
7. The UK input- output tables use a 77- industry classiﬁ  cation. This is compatible with NACE 
(Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes) Rev. 
1 and corresponds roughly to NACE three digit. We map this to the 237 industries in the UK 
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spatially concentrated. In this section, we consider this prediction empiri-
cally by regressing a measure of spatial concentration for each sector on a 
measure of the potential for labor pooling in the sector. Of course, other 
characteristics of industries may also aﬀect the extent of concentration, and 
we will need to control for these. That is, we estimate:
(14)  Cs        Ps    Xs    s,
where Cs is a measure of spatial concentration for sector s, Ps is a measure of 
the potential for labor pooling in the sector, Xi is a vector of sector charac-
teristics,  ,  , and   are parameters to be estimated, and  i is an identically 
and independently distributed error term.
This approach to investigating the signiﬁ  cance of diﬀerent motives for 
spatial concentration has been used before. (See Audretsch and Feldman 
[1996] and in particular Rosenthal and Strange [2001] to which our regres-
sions are most directly related.) The main novelty of our analysis is that 
by measuring the heterogeneity of individual establishments’ employment 
shocks in each sector, we are able to look explicitly at the potential for labor 
pooling of diﬀerent sectors. In contrast, as discussed next, the existing litera-
ture has had to rely on fairly indirect proxies to capture any possible eﬀect. 
We also oﬀer an important reﬁ  nement for measuring the importance of the 
sharing of intermediate input suppliers.
4.4.1      Measuring Each Sector’s Potential for Labor Pooling
The argument that labor pooling, by allowing establishments to better 
adapt to idiosyncratic shocks, can be an important determinant of agglom-
eration is well known. However, data restrictions mean that previous stud-
ies have had to get at this eﬀect indirectly by focusing, for example, on the 
extent to which workers in an industry are likely to have industry-  speciﬁ  c 
skills. Rosenthal and Strange (2001), for example, use three measures of 
labor pooling: net labor productivity (the value of shipments less the value 
of purchased inputs, all divided by the number of workers in the industry), 
the ratio of management workers to production workers, and the percentage 
of an industry’s workers with doctorates, master’s degrees, and bachelor’s 
degrees. These indirect measures are not ideal, because while sectors with 
a larger share of managers or high-  skilled workers may agglomerate partly 
because of labor pooling, there are many other reasons why they may con-
centrate geographically. For instance, agglomerations of high- skilled work-
ers may facilitate better matching between jobs and workers (see Helsley 
and Strange [1990]). Alternatively, large markets may also allow high- skilled 
workers to specialize in a narrower set of tasks and become more productive 
(see Baumgardner [1988], Becker and Murphy [1992], and Duranton [1998]), 
or they may help solve dual-  career problems for high-  skilled couples (see 
Costa and Kahn [2000]).
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the theoretical argument of section 4.2, from other labor market consid-
erations. The crucial point, as previously discussed, is that a labor pooling 
advantage only arises if whenever a plant expands employment, many other 
plants using similar workers are contracting and vice versa. That is, what 
matters is the plants’ idiosyncratic need to alter employment. To capture 
this eﬀect, we exploit the fact that we have a panel of plants over a long 
time period to construct a direct measure of the idiosyncratic nature of 
any given plant’s employment adjustments. To measure the idiosyncratic 
shock to a plant in any given year, we calculate the diﬀerence between the 
percentage change in the plant’s employment and the percentage change in 
the industry’s employment (in absolute value). This will take a high value 
for plants that either expand employment when the rest of the industry is 
contracting or vice versa. Taking the diﬀerence between the plant’s change 
and the industry’s change is important, because there is no labor pooling 
advantage if whenever the plant expands employment, many other plants 
using similar workers also expand.8 We then take the average of this variable 
across all years and across all plants in each sector. The resulting “pooling” 
measure captures how much idiosyncratic volatility is faced by individual 
establishments in each sector.
4.4.2      Measuring Each Sector’s Spatial Concentration
There are a variety of statistics that can be used to measure the extent of 
spatial concentration. We adopt the widely used index proposed by Ellison 
and Glaeser (1997). This measures the amount of clustering in a sector 
over and beyond that which we would expect to ﬁ  nd based on randomness 
alone. It has the advantage of being comparable across sectors and control-
ling for both the overall geographic concentration of employment and for 
the “lumpiness” of employment. This lumpiness arises because industrial 
concentration means plants are of diﬀerent sizes. This is a problem when 
trying to measure spatial concentration, because even random distribu-
tions of plants across spatial units can give rise to some places having more 
employment than others (if they happen, by chance, to get a particularly 
large plant). Because the Ellison-  Glaeser index controls for industrial con-
centration of the industry, it corrects for this problem. Let sa be the share 
of sector’s employment that is in area a and xa be the share of total manu-
facturing employment that is in area a. Then, the Ellison-  Glaeser index of 
geographical concentration is deﬁ  ned as:
(15)  Cs  
Gs   (1   ∑ax2
a)Hs    (1   ∑ax2
a)(1   Hs)
,
8. We are assuming that plants in the same industry use similar workers so that the plant’s 
industry is the appropriate reference group. When we turn to our results, we will also consider 
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where Gs is a raw localization index equal to
(16)  Gs  ∑
a
(sa   xa)2,
and




is the Herﬁ  ndahl index of the sector’s plant size distribution, with zi denoting 
plant i’s share of sector s’s employment. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) show 
that if plants are randomly distributed across locations with probabilities 
given by xa, then the expected value of this measure is zero. A positive value 
of the index indicates a level of spatial concentration over and above what 
one would expect by chance.
4.4.3    Results
Although we have panel data for the Ellison-  Glaeser index and some 
of the explanatory variables, preliminary regressions exploiting the panel 
dimension of the data did not perform well. Perhaps this is unsurprising, as 
location patterns change only slowly, while some of the industry character-
istics (e.g., research and development [R&D] expenditure per worker) can 
show a considerable amount of year-  on-  year variation. Furthermore, for 
the labor pooling measure, it is necessary to take into account plant-  level 
employment shocks relative to the sector for a number of years. Given both 
these considerations, we choose to average variables over time. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we split the time period in half and regress the average Ellison- Glaeser index 
for the six years from 1998 to 2003 on the average of the industry charac-
teristics from 1992 to 1997. This speciﬁ  cation has a rather nice economic 
interpretation whereby plants are able to observe industry characteristics 
before making their location decisions, so we would actually expect some lag 
from characteristics to outcomes. It also helps to partially address concerns 
about the endogeneity of some of the industry characteristics.
Figure 4.1 shows what happens when we plot (time-  averaged) values of 
the Ellison and Glaeser index against our (lagged time-  averaged) measure 
of the importance of labor market pooling.9 A regression of the Ellison 
and Glaeser index on a constant and our measure of labor market pooling 
gives a coeﬃcient on labor pooling of 0.1, signiﬁ  cant at the 4 percent level. 
The upward-  sloping line in ﬁ  gure 4.1 plots the predicted values from this 
regression. Overall, the ﬁ  gure provides preliminary evidence in favor of the 
importance of labor market pooling in explaining geographic concentration. 
Of course, many other industry characteristics may be correlated with both 
9. The plot and our econometric results drop one four- digit sector—1725: other textile weav-
ing—which is a large outlier in terms of our measure of labor market pooling (it takes a value 
over three times the next highest value and over 12 standard deviations away from the mean). 
Dropping this outlier does not aﬀect our regression results but does aﬀect the signiﬁ  cance of 
the univariate correlation coeﬃcient we report in the text.144        Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
geographic concentration and our measure of labor market pooling, and we 
will need to control for these to reach a more robust conclusion on the role 
of labor market pooling.
Before turning to our results, we now brieﬂ  y consider each of the industry 
characteristics for which we are able to control. The control variables for our 
ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation broadly follow Rosenthal and Strange (2001). We brieﬂ  y 
motivate all of them but refer the reader to Rosenthal and Strange (2001) 
for a more detailed discussion.
The availability of natural resources may diﬀer across regions. If natural 
resources are very spatially concentrated, then we would expect industries 
that use them intensively to be very spatially concentrated. Of course, if 
natural resources are very dispersed, then the opposite eﬀect could hold, and 
industries that use these resources intensively may be dispersed. As we do not 
have independent information on the distribution of resources, we capture 
the eﬀect of natural resources on geographic concentration by looking at 
each industry’s primary inputs (from agriculture, forestry, ﬁ  shing, mining, 
and quarrying) as a share of total inputs. As the preceding discussion makes 
clear, we do not have a strong prior on whether the impact will be positive 
or negative. Industries also diﬀer in the intensity with which they use water 
and energy. As the price of water and energy may diﬀer across regions, the 
intensity with which industries use these two inputs may aﬀect their spatial 
Fig. 4.1    Ellison and Glaeser geographic concentration index against potential for 
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distribution.10 We capture reliance on water using “collection, puriﬁ  cation 
and distribution of water” (IO 87) as a share of total inputs from the ONS 
input-  output tables. Eurostat’s detailed enterprise statistics provide data on 
the value of energy products purchased at the SIC four-  digit level, which 
we normalize by total inputs to provide a proxy for reliance on energy. We 
expect the coeﬃcients on these two variables to be positive and signiﬁ  cant 
if price variations across regions are large enough to aﬀect plant location 
and insigniﬁ  cant otherwise.
Turning to agglomeration forces, we start by following Rosenthal and 
Strange (2001) and using the purchase of goods and services as a share of 
inputs to capture the importance of vertical linkages. These are calculated 
using the input coeﬃcients on manufacturing (IO 8–  84) and nonmanufac-
turing industries (IO 107–  115, 118–  123), respectively, from the ONS input-
  output tables. The basic idea is that industries that buy or sell a lot from 
other plants may have an incentive to cluster near those plants. If the degree 
to which an industry buys goods and services as inputs captures this eﬀect, 
then we should expect the coeﬃcient on these two variables to be positive. 
As emphasized in models of new economic geography, the level of transport 
costs for an industry will be crucial in determining whether agglomeration 
forces outweigh dispersion forces leading to the spatial clustering of the 
industry. We use transport services (IO 93– 97) as a share of inputs to capture 
the impact of transport costs on industry spatial concentration, again using 
data from the ONS input-  output tables. As Rosenthal and Strange (2001) 
argue, this measure is not ideal, as it is most likely endogenous. Unfortu-
nately, for the United Kingdom, alternative data are not available in the 
time period that we consider. Finally, we use the share of R&D expenditure 
in value added to capture the possible role of technological externalities 
and knowledge spillovers in driving the spatial concentration of high-  tech 
industries. These are calculated on the basis of Eurostat’s detailed enterprise 
statistics for the United Kingdom.11
Results from a regression of the Ellison-  Glaeser index (averaged over 
the years 1998 to 2003) on these industry characteristics (averaged over the 
years 1992 to 1997) are given in column (1) of table 4.1. The main result of 
interest is the relationship between each sector’s potential for labor pooling 
and the spatial concentration in the sector. As predicted, the role of the 
labor pooling variable is positive and signiﬁ  cant. Thus, industries where, on 
10. The UK water industry is comprised of a number of privatized regional monopolies that 
have diﬀerent pricing structures. Thus, we allow for the possibility that water usage may play 
a role in industrial concentration, although the existence of a national regulator is likely to 
restrict the importance of water in practice.
11. Preliminary data for all these variables were kindly provided by Roberto Picchizzolu, a 
PhD student in the department of geography and environment at the London School of Eco-
nomics. The ﬁ  nal version of our data continues to use the energy and R&D variables provided 
by Picchizzolu, but the remaining variables are based on the authors own calculations from the 
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average, plants face more idiosyncratic shocks relative to their industry are 
more spatially concentrated.
Turning to other determinants of spatial clustering, a high natural resource 
requirement actually causes industries to be less spatially concentrated than 
they otherwise would be. This may well reﬂ  ect the fact that agricultural 
inputs tend to dominate for most industries where natural resource inputs 
are important, and at least in the United Kingdom, agricultural activity is 
reasonably dispersed across the country. Water and energy use have no sig-
Table 4.1  Regression of localization and urbanization on industry characteristics
Ellison-  Glaeser localization index Urbanization
Dependent variable:   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Pooling (plant to sector) 0.1167 0.1261 0.1261 0.0169
(0.0535)∗∗ (0.0521)∗∗ (0.0523)∗∗ (0.0685)
Pooling (plant to United  0.0196
 Kingdom) (0.0113)∗
Pooling (sector to United  0.0002 0.0026
 Kingdom) (0.0106) (0.0068)
Natural resources as share  –0.1656 –0.1782 –0.1689 –0.1782 –0.1496
 of  inputs (0.0493)∗∗∗ (0.0571)∗∗∗ (0.0566)∗∗∗ (0.0572)∗∗∗ (0.0708)∗∗
Water as share of inputs 1.7106 0.7851 1.8663 0.7898 –1.1054
(3.0794) (2.7732) (2.7124) (2.7105) (3.1246)
Energy as share of inputs –0.0748 –0.3268 –0.3615 –0.3274 –0.7768
(0.3603) (0.3533) (0.3472) (0.346) (0.3550)∗∗
Goods as share of inputs –0.1866 –0.2453 –0.2512 –0.2453 –0.1621
(0.0758)∗∗ (0.0847)∗∗∗ (0.0863)∗∗∗ (0.0851)∗∗∗ (0.0707)∗∗
Services as share of inputs –0.5701 –0.4079 –0.3803 –0.408 –0.1773
(0.1628)∗∗∗ (0.1580)∗∗ (0.1546)∗∗ (0.1576)∗∗ (0.1966)
Share of R&D expenditure   –1.8371 –2.0807 –2.2511 –2.0771 –3.3887
  in value added (1.2614) (1.2106)∗ (1.2184)∗ (1.2141)∗ (1.1219)∗∗∗
Transport costs as share of  –0.4248 –0.4265 –0.4604 –0.4261 –0.2855
 inputs (0.1403)∗∗∗ (0.1356)∗∗∗ (0.1376)∗∗∗ (0.1387)∗∗∗ (0.1123)∗∗
Own industry as share of  0.095 0.0937 0.0949 0.0928
 inputs (0.0285)∗∗∗ (0.0287)∗∗∗ (0.0285)∗∗∗ (0.0337)∗∗∗
IO weighted EG index 0.5767 0.5422 0.5756 –0.155
(0.2512)∗∗ (0.2541)∗∗ (0.2502)∗∗ (0.2172)
Constant 0.1501 0.1426 0.1666 0.1425 0.1438
(0.0459)∗∗∗ (0.0485)∗∗∗ (0.0501)∗∗∗ (0.0490)∗∗∗ (0.0454)∗∗∗
R2 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13
Observations   235   235   235   235   235
Notes: Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable for columns (1) through (4) is the 
Ellison and Glaeser (EG) index of localization or spatial concentration; for column (5), it is the percent-
age of industry in the three largest UK TTWA in terms of manufacturing employment (London, Man-
chester, and Birmingham).
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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niﬁ  cant eﬀect on spatial concentration. As suggested previously, this is prob-
ably because price variations are not that large across UK regions. Ignoring 
for one moment the role of purchases of goods and services, we see that the 
share of R&D expenditure in value added does not have a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect. 
The ﬁ  nal variable, transport costs, has a negative and signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on 
spatial concentration. As expected, industries with high transport costs are 
more dispersed.
Perhaps the biggest surprise are the negative and signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients 
on the purchase of goods and services as a share of inputs. As we already 
discussed, if these variables are actually capturing vertical linkages, then we 
would expect them to have a positive signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on spatial concen-
tration.12 How then do we explain the negative coeﬃcients? It may be that 
sharing intermediate suppliers is not an important motive for agglomera-
tion, but other evidence suggests it is.13 The answer, it turns out, is similar 
to that which explains the negative coeﬃcient on natural resources. When 
an industry buys a lot from other industries, the eﬀect on its concentration 
in turn will depend on whether those industries are spatially concentrated 
or dispersed. For instance, the meat processing industry is a large buyer 
of inputs from farms and from the plastic ﬁ  lm industry. However, farms 
are very dispersed across the country, and so is the plastic ﬁ  lm industry, 
since it supplies many other sectors located in diﬀerent places, in addition 
to processing meat. Hence, the meat processing industry has no reason to 
concentrate spatially, even if it makes large intermediate purchases: it can 
easily ﬁ  nd its inputs everywhere. For a sector to cluster to share intermediate 
suppliers, it must be the case that the sector not only makes large purchases 
of intermediates but also that those intermediates are supplied by industries 
that are themselves very spatially concentrated. Following this line of rea-
soning, to better capture the importance of vertical linkages for a particular 
industry, s, we calculate the input share weighted sum of the Ellison- Glaeser 
index across all industries from which industry s purchases intermediates. 
That is, we calculate:
(18)  Vs   ∑
j s
IsjCj,
where Vs is our new measure of vertical linkages, Isj is the share of sector j 
in sector s’s intermediate inputs from other sectors, and Cs is the Ellison-
  Glaeser index of spatial concentration for sector j. Notice that for obvious 
reasons, we exclude industry s’s own Ellison- Glaeser index from this calcula-
tion. However, we would expect ceteris paribus industries that buy a large 
share of intermediate inputs from their own industry to be more spatially 
12. Rosenthal and Strange (2001) ﬁ  nd no signiﬁ  cant eﬀect for these variables.
13. Holmes (1999) looks at variations in intermediate input purchases within sectors across 
locations and ﬁ  nds a strong connection between spatial concentration and intermediate pur-
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concentrated. To capture this, we can include Iss, the share of intermediates 
purchased from own industry, in the regression, in addition to the vertical 
linkages variable.
Column (2) in table 4.1 shows what happens when we include these two 
new variables. We see that both the own- industry inputs as a share of inputs 
and the input-  output weighted Ellison-  Glaeser index have a positive and 
signiﬁ  cant impact on spatial concentration. Industries that buy a lot of inter-
mediates from other plants in the same industry or that buy a lot of inter-
mediates from other industries that are spatially concentrated are in turn 
more spatially concentrated. We see that the coeﬃcients on goods purchased 
and services purchased remain negative and signiﬁ  cant. That is, purchasing 
large amounts of inputs per se has a negative impact on spatial concentra-
tion. Finally, note that the coeﬃcient on our main variable of interest, labor 
market pooling, remains positive and signiﬁ  cant.
So far, we have assumed that the appropriate reference group for calculat-
ing our measure of labor pooling is the industry. An alternative would be 
to consider idiosyncratic shocks relative to manufacturing as a whole; that 
is, to use a measure of labor market pooling that is calculated as before, but 
this time using the sectoral average of the diﬀerence between the percent-
age change in the plant’s employment and the percentage change in UK 
manufacturing employment (in absolute value). Column (3) of table 4.1 
reports results when we use this alternative measure of labor market pool-
ing. As can be seen, the coeﬃcient on this alternative measure is positive and 
signiﬁ  cant. Conceptually, we can think of this alternative measure (plants 
relative to UK manufacturing as a whole) as being disaggregated into two 
orthogonal components: plants relative to their industry (“plant to sector”) 
and industries relative to the whole of UK manufacturing (“sector to United 
Kingdom”).14 From column (4) of table 4.1, we see that the ﬁ  nding of a sig-
niﬁ  cant coeﬃcient on the pooling measure calculated using plants relative 
to UK manufacturing as a whole is purely driven by plants experiencing 
idiosyncratic shocks relative to their industry (“plant to sector”). Industries 
that tend to experience idiosyncratic results relative to manufacturing as a 
whole (“sector to United Kingdom”) do not tend to be more geographically 
concentrated.
This raises the interesting question, however, of whether these industries 
are more likely to go to larger locations where they can beneﬁ  t from labor 
market pooling across sectors rather than within their own sector. To con-
sider this possibility, we can undertake a similar exercise, but this time using 
as our dependent variable a measure of the extent to which the industry is 
14. Formally, this decomposition is not exact, but in practice, it holds to a close approxima-
tion. As a result, including all three measures does not make any sense, given that they are 
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urbanized rather than geographically concentrated. To measure urbaniza-
tion, we take the share of each industry in the three largest manufacturing 
cities in the United Kingdom (London, Manchester, and Birmingham).15 
The ﬁ  nal column of table 4.1 shows the results when we regress this measure 
of urbanization on the two components of labor pooling (plant to sector and 
sector to United Kingdom) and other industry characteristics. We ﬁ  nd no 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on urbanization of either measure. In results not reported 
here, we also ﬁ  nd no eﬀect if we simply use the combined measure based on 
plants relative to the whole of UK manufacturing.
Do our ﬁ  ndings suggest that labor market pooling plays no role in explain-
ing urbanization? We would argue not. The central problem, of course, is 
whether our measure is capturing the correct reference group when calculat-
ing the importance of idiosyncratic shocks. For localization, our measure 
is appropriate if workers move easily within four-  digit sectors. This seems 
a reasonable assumption, and so we are able to identify an eﬀect from our 
labor pooling measure on localization. However, for urbanization, our mea-
sure is only appropriate if workers move easily across sectors. This is unlikely 
to be the case, suggesting that our results could easily be explained by the use 
of an inappropriate reference group when considering urbanization rather 
than by there being no eﬀect of labor market pooling. Unfortunately, mak-
ing any progress on deﬁ  ning the appropriate reference group would require 
data on worker moves between industries. This data is not available from 
the Annual Respondents Database that we use in this chapter. Finally, we 
also note that we are only considering manufacturing sectors, and it is often 
argued that urbanization is more important for services than for manufac-
turing.
4.5    Conclusions
Since Alfred Marshall talked about labor pooling as a source of agglom-
eration, it has been the focus of much interest in the urban economics lit-
erature. Existing empirical studies tend to ﬁ  nd that labor market issues play 
a key role in leading industries to cluster, but despite the interest in labor 
pooling, we have so far not had a direct test of whether ironing out plant-
  level shocks by drawing workers from a large local pool is at least in part 
an explanation of these labor market eﬀects. In this chapter, we have devel-
oped a novel measure that captures precisely this aspect: we calculate the 
ﬂ  uctuations in employment of individual establishments relative to their 
sector and average these across the sector and over time. Our results show 
15. Our decision to rank cities in terms of manufacturing employment reﬂ  ects the fact that 
the pooling mechanism relies on movements between plants, and such movements are less likely 
between services and manufacturing than within manufacturing.150        Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga
that sectors whose establishments experience more idiosyncratic volatility 
are more spatially concentrated, even after controlling for a range of other 
industry characteristics.
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